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The transcendental approach to understanding narrative 
argument derives from the idea that for any believable 
fictional narrative, we can ask—what principles or 
generalizations would have to be true of human nature in 
order for the narrative to be believable? I address two key 
issues: whether only realistic or realist fictional narratives are 
believable, and how could it be established that we have an 
intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature that grounds 
believability?  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In approximately the past decade, argumentation studies have become 
increasingly concerned with how fictional narratives, taken as wholes, 
may be argumentative. Since argument can provide the justification 
needed for knowledge, this question concerns the cognitive value of 
fictional literature. Nevertheless, both traditional aestheticians and 
argumentation theorists have tended to neglect this connection; there 
tends to be a narrow focus by these researchers on only one of these 
elements: the possibilities for knowledge or the possibilities for 
argument, respectively. I will try to help broaden the focus here. Three 
recent approaches to considering how fictional narratives may be 
argumentative understand narratives to exhibit the structure of 
suppositional, analogical, or a kind of transcendental argument. For 
example, Green (2010, p. 360) sees Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World as 
an “implicit” reductio ad absurdum, where the supposition is that society 
is “organized along the lines dictated by hedonistic utilitarianism.” 
Rodden (2008) proposes that there is an “enthymematic…analogy 
between our world and the world of [George Orwell’s novel] 1984” (pp. 
167-169); it is an “argument against political tyranny and 
totalitarianism” (p. 156). This paper will be concerned with two key 
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epistemic issues that arise for the transcendental approach, the 
approach that I have been developing since my paper for the 2010 ISSA 
conference (Plumer, 2011a; 2011b; 2013; 2015a; 2015b; 2016; and 
2017). 
 The basics of the transcendental approach are as follows: Being 
believable is a central necessary condition for an extended fictional 
narrative to be good. It is always reasonable to ask about such a 
narrative—is it successful ‘make-believe’? Yet for any believable fiction 
we can ask—what principles or generalizations would have to be true of 
human nature in order for the fiction to be believable? Whatever these 
are, generally we can, subject to a proviso, infer that they are in fact true 
of human nature. The proviso is that we have an intuitive, mostly 
veridical grasp of human nature that grounds this believability. So for 
any extended fictional narrative that is given in experience as 
believable, a transcendental argument is generated with this pattern: 
 
(A) This is believable. 
 
(B) This is believable only if such and such principles are true of human 
nature. 
 
(C) Therefore, such and such principles are true of human nature. 
 
The idea is that in virtue of being believable (not claiming to be 
believable), an extended fiction makes an argument telling us something 
about the real world of human psychology, action, and society. As a 
possible illustration, consider Nussbaum (1990, pp. 139-140) on Henry 
James’ The Golden Bowl (I inserted the steps of the transcendental 
argument following indications in Nussbaum’s text): 
 
The claim that (C) our loves and commitments are so related 
that infidelity and failure of response are more or less 
inevitable features even of the best examples of loving is a 
claim for which a philosophical text would have a hard time 
mounting direct argument. It is (A) only when, as here, we 
study the loves and attentions of a finely responsive mind such 
as Maggie’s, through all the contingent complexities of a 
tangled human life, that….we have something like (B) a 
persuasive argument that these features hold of human life in 
general. 
 
The Nussbaum quotation illustrates what is not all that uncommon: a 
vague, undeveloped recognition of a transcendental structure of 
narrative argument.  
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(A)-(C) constitute a schematic meta-level representation of the 
transcendental argument of a believable fictional narrative, which, at 
the object level, is only indirectly expressed or embodied by the 
narrative. Still, the reader or critic can summarize how the argument 
proceeds at the object level, including stating true generalizations about 
human nature, as Nussbaum takes herself to be articulating with respect 
to The Golden Bowl. She summarizes the argument she discerns in her 
reflective experience of believability.  
The (A)-(C) argument schema raises many questions, but two 
important ones are, first, whether only realistic or realist fictional 
narratives are believable, and, second, how could it be shown that we 
have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp of human nature—which would 
ground believability? The remainder of this paper will address these 
two issues. 
 
2.  BELIEVABILITY AND REALISM 
 
The experience of a fictional narrative’s believability of course involves 
believing that its event complex, in some sense, could have been true. As 
Aristotle said, “the poet’s job is not to tell what has happened but the 
kind of things that can happen” (Poetics, 1451a 36–38). So how realistic 
must fictional possibilities be? I contend that believability and realism 
are distinct notions with respect to fictional narratives. Franz Kafka’s 
The Metamorphosis, wherein Gregor Samsa wakes up and lives as a huge 
Ungeziefer, is not realistic or realist; nor are stories of time travel or any 
number of ‘shock-and-awe’ action films. Yet such narratives can be 
believable because, in conformity to the norms of the genre at hand, we 
bracket or suspend certain things that we know in order to give the 
work a fair chance in the imagination. We are willing to bracket if a 
worthwhile purpose may be achieved, although we bracket primarily 
with respect to physical rather than human nature. Imaginative 
resistance or failure is encountered when the work as a whole narrates 
an incoherent sequence of events, or violates our shared fundamental 
assumptions about human nature. Then it is not believable. 
In The Metamorphosis there are exquisite short descriptions of 
what it is like for Gregor to become a huge cockroach (though not what 
it is like for a cockroach to be a cockroach). Kafka gives just enough 
detail to establish Gregor’s altered physical state; otherwise, the story is 
about his thoroughly human mental life and what his transformation 
reveals about his family and coworkers. 
While the purpose of this alteration of physical reality in a 
narrative may be disputable, in other cases it can be entirely 
straightforward. For instance, given human lifespans, our interacting in 
person with any civilization residing in another part of the galaxy would 
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not be possible without supposing the ability to travel faster than the 
speed of light. Without the fictional invention of something like ‘warp 
drive’, what we can learn through narrative about life and ourselves 
from such possible encounters would be foreclosed. 
Some of my discussion here of the question of realism is pretty 
standard fare. For example, Green (2010, p. 356) says: 
 
Magical realism (exemplified in the works of…Toni Morrison, 
and Salman Rushdie) permits violations of laws of human 
physiology. Science fiction permits violation of current 
technological limitations. However, that does not mean that 
such literature is sheer fantasy. Even in these genres the 
author must adhere to a plausible human psychology. 
 
However, we should ask—why “must”? I think this is a question for 
which the standard view has no clear answer. My answer is that 
otherwise there is no prospect of believability. Furthermore, this is not a 
genre-specific question, that is, regardless of genre, there is otherwise 
no prospect of believability. 
 
3. INTIMATIONS OF REALITY 
 
How could it be shown that we have an intuitive, mostly veridical grasp 
of human nature—that our fundamental shared assumptions about 
human nature are generally true? This would ground believability, that 
is, ground it in reality, making the (A)-(C) argument in any given 
believable fictional narrative probabilistically sound (having the form of 
modus ponens, it is of course valid). 
 One approach that seems to have promise regarding this 
question is Wittgenstein’s idea that we share a “form of life” that is 
critical to making us the kind of creatures we are; we understand each 
other, but “if a lion could talk, we could not understand him” (a famed 
remark in his Philosophical Investigations). Wittgenstein’s notion of a 
form of life has long been the subject of scholarship. Yet one view 
elegantly attempts to meld the major competing interpretations into 
four levels: “(1) a biological level from which (2) unique human 
activities like pretending, grieving, etc. are then expressed in (3) various 
cultural styles that in turn have their formal ground in a (4) general 
socio-linguistic framework” (Gier, 1980, p. 245). This picture indicates 
that whatever intuitive grasp we have of human nature is shared, at 
least allows that it is mostly veridical, and points to an explanation—
that would appeal to cultural and socio-linguistic practices—both of 
how that grasp could become reflective knowledge as well as of how it 
could sometimes become distorted or lost. 
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In some respects similarly, Nagel argues in a seminal paper 
(1974) that because after all we are human, we know what it is like to be 
human in a way we do not know what it is like to have a different nature, 
such as a bat’s. The phrase ‘what it is like’ here refers to a “species-
specific viewpoint” (p. 445); it does not mean “‘what (in our experience) 
it resembles’, but rather ‘how it is for the subject himself’” (p. 440n6). So, 
what we do not know is “what it is like for a bat to be a bat” (p. 439). 
Nagel’s claim has much immediate appeal; the phrase ‘what is it like 
(to)’ has become a philosophical trope. The claim could be construed as 
more or less amounting to the claim that we (humans) share a basic 
intuitive grasp of human nature that is mostly veridical—an unmediated 
grasp that we do not have of the nature of any other species. However, 
Nagel’s notion of what it is like for an organism of a certain species to be 
that organism expressly has to do only with conscious experience (p. 
436), e.g., grieving, perceiving through echolocation, etc. 
Nagel’s notion of what it is like to be human could be broadened 
to include distinctive apprehensions not clearly belonging to conscious 
experience, such as recognition of other minds or of one’s own 
mortality. But perhaps the most relevant broadening would be to 
include basic human psychological competence, for it is this that has 
been most questioned in recent attacks on the persistent belief that 
fictional narratives can teach us about human nature apart from any 
didacticism or polemics they contain. Leading the opposition is Currie, 
who says (2012, p. 30): 
 
And could [Samuel] Johnson have been rationally confident 
that Shakespeare has shown how human nature acts in real 
exigencies, when he, Johnson, carried out no surveys, no 
carefully structured experiments, to find out whether it really 
was so?...[T]he last 50 years of psychological investigation has 
shown how often we are wrong about our own motives and 
actions, and those of others, and how little penetrating 
intellect and common sense can help us overcome our 
ignorance. 
 
Here are several representative examples of the kind of research results 
that Currie mentions: One allegation is that folk psychology, like the 
novel for example, believes in character and character explanations, and 
that makes us prone to error, as when we “infer good Character from 
attractive appearance.” Experiments suggest that small changes in 
circumstances can make a big difference in our behavior, contrary to the 
supposition of character. Of seminarians on their way to “give a short 
talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan,” one group was told there 
was “no hurry,” and the rest that they were “slightly late.” On the way, “a 
confederate faked a collapse.” Compared to those in the no-hurry group, 
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the others were a great deal more likely to ignore and even step over 
the collapsed person (Currie, 2010, pp. 202-203). We also tend to be 
“more persuaded” by a message if it has a pleasurable accompaniment 
such as speaker attractiveness or if it is expressed in a rhyme, for 
instance, “a stitch in time saves nine.” These are two irrelevant factors 
that studies indicate contribute to “a feeling for truth” (Currie, 2016, pp. 
304-305). 
 But no matter how many such results are cited, it still looks like 
a failure to see the forest for the trees. Judging by biological measures 
such as population and adaptability to different environments, Homo 
sapiens is an extremely and uniquely successful social species. It is hard 
to see how this success would be possible if Currie were right that “our 
insight into the mind generally is very limited” (2010, p. 201). Our 
fundamental, shared assumptions about human nature allow us to 
function and flourish, and this is evidence of their (at least approximate) 
truth, in much the same way that the spectacular success of the physical 
sciences in their predictive power and technological applications (‘they 
work’) is evidence of their (at least approximate) truth. 
I contend that humans are basically psychologically competent. 
If this claim is understood as making the relatively modest point that 
humans almost universally have a set of cognitive capacities with a 
common developmental profile that generally makes us good at 
‘mindreading’, it would be hard to find a psychologist or philosopher 
who disagrees. Mindreading includes the capacities to predict human 
behavior and to offer explanations of it by attributing mental states such 
as perceptions, beliefs, desires, and fears. There are two principal 
theories (each with a number of variants) that seek to explain how 
mindreading is achieved. As its name suggests, the ‘theory-theory’ holds 
that we naturally possess a theory of mind or reservoir of systematized 
mental information that is accessed and applied in mindreading. The 
other theory is that of mental simulation. The idea here is that one 
mindreads by automatically internalizing another’s mental state (as 
through sympathetic emotion) or more intentionally by putting oneself 
in the place of the other (or oneself in a supposed situation) and ‘just’ 
seeing what one would do, believe, infer, decide, fear, etc. in those 
circumstances. What I would like to urge is that either one of these two 
theories (or a hybrid of them), if true, supports my presupposition that 
we share a significant set of fundamental assumptions about human 
nature. It is just that these assumptions are more conceptual for theory-
theory and intuitive for simulation theory. The two theories differ in the 
box they postulate that yields the same mindreading outputs given the 
inputs. It is not as if simulation theory has eliminated the box, and 
stimulus and response is all there is (in the manner of old-fashioned 
behaviorism). 
  7 
I think that the fact that we are generally good at mindreading 
supports the proposition that our basic shared assumptions about 
human nature are generally true. An opposing view is eliminative 
materialism, which holds that “our common-sense conception of 
psychological phenomena [“folk psychology”] constitutes a radically 
false theory,” according to Paul Churchland (1981, p. 67), who is 
perhaps its strongest champion. However, even he says that folk 
psychology “is a central part of our current lebenswelt, and serves as the 
principal vehicle of our interpersonal commerce” (p. 76). For 
Churchland, the operative word here is “current,” for he thinks that folk 
psychology is likely to be eventually replaced by some form of 
“neuroscience.” He describes a series of three increasingly far-fetched 
“scenarios” whereby this replacement might occur. Considering only the 
first scenario and ignoring details, we still read “being projections of 
that inner reality, such [folk psychological] sentences do carry 
significant information regarding it and are thus fit to function as 
elements in a communication system,” although “they reflect but a 
narrow part of the reality projected” (pp. 82-83). Is this representative 
of the fate of eliminative materialism? It is hard to see it as not allowing 
substantial truth to folk psychology, which is more or less all anyone 
claims anyway.  
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